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"STANDARDS AND PRACTICES": THE
JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN PROMOTING SAFETY
IN THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM
KEVIN N. CoURToIs
I. INTRODUCTION
THE NATION'S air traffic control system is under in-
dictment. In a Pulitzer Prize winning article, the Dallas
Morning News proclaimed in large print, "System allows
[aircraft] 50SK to fly blindly to death."' The reporter
spent twenty-two months with the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB) investigating the 1986 crash of
a Singer Corporation Jet, 50 Sierra Kilo, that killed seven
people in East Texas.2 The article pointed out that four
of the NTSB's nine findings of probable cause related to
mistakes by FAA personnel.3 Referring to a 1977 NTSB
report which warned of inadequate procedures for dis-
seminating weather information to pilots, the reporter
said "[t]he irony of 50 Sierra Kilo was that seven men died
in part because the adequate level of safety the NTSB said
didn't exist in 1977 still didn't exist in 1986. Nor does it
exist today."'4 The author concluded that "[h]istorically,
Hanners, Anatomy of an Air Crash: The Final Flight of 50 Sierra Kilo, Dallas Morn-
ing News, Feb. 7, 1988, § M, at 11, col. 1. Reporter David Hanners, artist Karen
Blessen, and photographer William Snyder won the 1989 Pulitzer Prize for ex-
planatory journalism for their 12 page special section covering the National
Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the crash of a twin engine execu-
tive jet during a violent thunderstorm. Dallas Morning News, March 31, 1989, at
1, col. 1.
2 Hanners, supra note 1, at 2, col. 1.
, Id. at 11, col. 3.
4 Id. at 11, col. 1.
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the FAA has not only fought to keep separation as the
controller's first priority, but also has battled tenaciously
to keep controller responsibility-and the agency's legal
liability-to a minimum. ' 5
Findings from the nation's longest major aviation trial,
which concluded recently, illustrate the nature of the
problem.6 At issue was government liability for the 1985
crash of Delta Flight 191 at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
(D/FW).7 The crash killed 137 people, including 128 pas-
sengers, 8 crew members and one person on the ground."
Although the government avoided liability,9 Federal
Judge Belew of the Northern District of Texas found: (1)
D/FW air traffic control personnel breached a legal duty
by failing to warn incoming aircraft of hazardous weather
near the airport; (2) a National Weather Service (NWS)
meteorologist breached a legal duty by taking a dinner
break without making arrangements to have the weather
monitored in his absence; and (3) a NWS weather coordi-
nator breached a legal duty by failing to maintain a con-
5 Id. at 12, col. 1.
6 See Dallas Morning News, Sept. 2, 1989, § A, at 26, col. 1 (referring to litiga-
tion related to the crash of Delta Flight 191 at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport in
1985).
7 See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex.
1989). Following the crash of a Delta Airlines, Inc. (Delta) L-10 11 aircraft, 115
lawsuits were filed against Delta. Id. at 1261. All cases filed in federal courts were
transferred to the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas for
discovery and trial preparation. Id. at 1261 n.3. Delta was granted leave to file a
third party complaint against the United States Government in all cases in which it
had been named a defendant. Alleging negligence on the part of employees of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Weather Service
(NWS), Delta sought compensation for the value of the aircraft and contribution
for damages it would pay on personal injury and death claims. Delta's third party
claims were severed from the individual plaintiff's cases and retained by the
Northern District Court. The Northern District also retained jurisdiction of the
claims of widows of two crew members who sued the government. Total claims
were estimated at between 150 and 200 million dollars. Id. at 1261-62.
I d. at 1261. Twenty-four passengers and three crew members survived the
immediate crash. Id.
Id. at 1289. The government avoided liability because Delta failed to prove
that the government's actions proximately caused the crash. The pilots had notice
of the severe weather from other sources and insufficient evidence was presented
about whether the pilots would have performed differently had the government
confirmed information the pilots already knew. Id. at 1290.
tinuous weather watch during the meteorologist's
absence. 1o
Although FAA statistics show that flying remains a rela-
tively safe mode of transportation," disturbing incidents
continue to arise which indicate the system is not as safe
as it should be. For example, on October 14, 1989, traffic
was heavy at D/FW airport as fans from the University of
Texas and the University of Oklahoma converged on Dal-
las for the annual football game between the two
schools.' 2 When the airport's computer system began to
strain under the heavy load, a software technician at-
tempted to take some non-critical applications off-line. In
the process, the controller's radar screens were frozen for
nineteen minutes. During this nineteen minute period,
more than 100 aircraft were flying in the vicinity of the
airport. Controllers reported "a bunch" of near midair
collisions. According to the controllers, only good
weather and high visibility prevented a disaster. 13
Most aviation accidents result from the interplay of a
variety of factors and judges, of course, have no control
over most of these factors.1 4 The crash of 50 Sierra Kilo,
for example, was attributed to a chain of events which in-
cluded severe weather conditions, equipment malfunc-
tions and mechanical limitations, in addition to "the
Io Id. at 1289.
" In 1989, the NTSB reported 24 accidents, including 8 with fatalities, of pas-
senger flights from the major scheduled airlines. As a fraction of the number of
departures, the number of accidents among scheduled airliners is small, about
.109 per 100,000 departures in 1989. AIR SAFETY WEEK,Jan. 22, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
1 COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
is Id. Computer malfunctions of this type have occurred on other occasions at
D/FW airport. Controllers at D/FW keep records of computer "blackouts" and
have documented at least 12 in the last two years. Most last only a few minutes
but at least two lasted more than 14 minutes. COMPurERWORLD, Mar. 5, 1990, at
1, col. 4.
14 Referring to Judge Belew's decision in the Delta 191 case, Roy Krieger, a
former U.S. Justice Department attorney who defended the government in the
Delta trial, commented that "[Judge Belew] can't improve the technology, and he
can't tell them to speed up the development of technology." Dallas Morning
News, Sept. 2, 1989, § A, at 28, col. 2. Government attorneys also pointed out
that Judge Belew had no standing to question the level of funding the NWS gets
or how it spends its money. Id. at 28, col. 4.
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problem-plagued air traffic control system."' 5 Likewise,
technological limitations, weather, and several human fac-
tors contributed to the crash of Delta 191.16
Nevertheless, judges can affect the safety of the system.
One of the purported goals of our tort law system is the
regulation of safety, which is based on the assumption
that judicial decisions influence the conduct of members
of society and hence the safety of society.' 7 This com-
ment will address the effect of aviation related jurispru-
dence on the safety of the air traffic control system. The
issue is whether the current judicial approach to assessing
government liability for aviation accidents fosters a safer
system. Part II will address the Federal Tort Claims Act
and the procedures for bringing suit against the govern-
ment.'8 Part III will cover the elements of a cause of ac-
tion in negligence against the government.'" Part IV will
analyze the effect of court decisions on the safety of the
system. °
II. SUING THE GOVERNMENT UNDER THE FTCA
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, parties in-
jured by the government may sue for compensation only
if the government consents to suit.2 ' The Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946 (FTCA)22 provides the necessary con-
15 Hanners, supra note 1, at 11, col. 1.
16 Dallas Morning News, Sept. 2, 1989, § A, at 28. In addition to air traffic
controller negligence, the court found: (1) under the prevailing weather condi-
tions, a prudent pilot would have executed a missed approach; (2) Delta's overall
training program, including wind shear instruction, had been lax, although not so
derelict to be negligent; and (3) the captain of the flight was negligent in failing to
satisfy medical information reporting requirements, although the captain's negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of the crash. Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth, 720 F.
Supp. at 1285-88.
1" See infra note 194 for a discussion of the goals of tort law.
is See infra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 45-193 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text.
' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 798 (1824)
("The Constitution merely ordains, that a State, in its sovereign capacity, shall not
be sued.").
22 h. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
[55
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sent for some types of claims and sets the terms and con-
ditions under which plaintiffs may bring suit.2 3 Actions
against the government based on the negligent conduct of
its employees in the provision of air traffic control services
are subject to the provisions of the FTCA and must meet
FTCA requirements and limitations.24
The government's waiver of immunity under the FTCA
is by no means complete; the Act includes a number of
specific exceptions which preserve government immunity
in specific areas.2 5 The exception that has generated the
most attention in aviation litigation against the govern-
ment is the "discretionary function" exception which pro-
tects the government against plaintiffs seeking to
challenge the policy decisions of government employ-
ees. 26 In the past, government attorneys have argued that
an air traffic controller's conduct is protected under the
discretionary function exception.2 7 Courts have consist-
23 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Section 1346(b) provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on or after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his of-
fice or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id.
24 For a discussion of the procedural aspects of bringing an action against the
government under the FTCA, see Silverman, The Ins and Outs of Filing a Claim
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45J. AIR L. & CoM. 41 (1979).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). Section 2680 lists 13 exceptions to the waiver of
tort immunity. Id.
26 Id. § 2680(a). Under section 2680(a), the United States should not be liable
to "[any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused." Id.; see generally Comment, Discretion and the FAA: An Overview of the Appli-
cability of the Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act to FAA Activ-
ity, 49J. AIR L. & CoM. 143 (1983); Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act. Discretion and
the Air Traffic Controller, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 413 (1972).
27 E.g., Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir.) (stat-
ing "[t]he heart of the question [is] whether the Government is correct in saying
.. 'that the tower operator's duties are public in nature and involve the exercise
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ently rejected this argument, however, finding the air traf-
fic control function more operational than discretionary. 28
Although air traffic controllers exercise some amount of
judgment in carrying out their responsibilities, the courts
have determined that Congress simply did not intend to
protect functions like those exercised by air traffic
controllers.29
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co. 30 is the primary au-
thority for the proposition that an air traffic controller's
responsibilities are operational in nature and, therefore,
subject to suit under the FTCA .3  Eastern was a case
against the government and a commercial airline which
arose when two planes crashed after controllers cleared
them to land on the same runway at the same time.32 The
court rejected the government's argument for protection
under the discretionary function exception, characterizing
the controller's conduct as the handling of "operational
details."3 3 The court concluded that the FTCA permits
suits against the government for damages which result
when air traffic controllers negligently execute their
of discretion and judgment' "), rev'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962
(1956).
28 See, e.g., id. (rejecting the government's contention that a tower operator's
duties involve the exercise of discretion and judgment); Ingham v. Eastern Air
Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the government's argument that reporting
weather changes to incoming flights was a "discretionary" function which could
not be used as the basis of liability), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
29 Eastern, 221 F.2d at 75 (holding that air traffic controller conduct is not pro-
tected by the discretionary function exception).
3o 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), modified, 350 U.S. 962
(1956).
31 Id. at 75.
12 Id. at 64-68. At about the same time as an Eastern Air Lines DC-4 was
cleared to land on Washington National Airport's runway three, a Bolivian P-38
which had just taken off developed engine trouble and requested permission to
turn around and land. The Bolivian plane was cleared to land behind the DC-4 on
runway three. The Bolivian pilot became confused about which plane he was sup-
posed to follow onto the runway. Thinking the other plane cleared for the same
runway was already on the ground, the pilot of the P-38 descended toward the
runway and collided with the DC-4. All fifty-five passengers aboard the DC-4
died. The Bolivian pilot survived. This suit was one of several brought against
Eastern, the Bolivian pilot, and the United States on behalf of the estates of pas-
sengers killed in the crash. Id. at 64-67.
" Id. at 75. The court stated "tower operators merely handle operational de-
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responsibilities .
The discretionary function exception, however, does
prohibit suits challenging the content of regulations
which govern air traffic controllers in the execution of
their duties. 5 In a suit against the government following
the crash of a commercial airliner at Greater Cincinnati
Airport, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision
exonerating the government from liability in an action
based in part on the claimed failure of the government to
impose stricter procedures.3 6 The general rule to be dis-
tilled from these cases is that government employee con-
duct which involves the execution of established policies
can form the basis of a tort claim against the government
but conduct involving the formulation of those policies is
immune from judicial review."
FTCA claims must meet two requirements in addition
to qualifying under the operational activity standard. 8
First, the government employee must have acted within
the scope of his employment.3 9 Second, the employee's
conduct must be of a nature that if a private person en-
gaged in the same conduct that person would be held lia-
ble under the law where the act or omission occurred. 0
tails which are outside the area of the discretionary functions and duties referred
to in § 2680(a)." Id.
The discretionary function exception applies to policy level decisions rather
than operational level conduct even though judgment may be required in execut-
ing operational details. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35 (1953) (holding
that discretion exists where there is room for policy judgment).
34 Eastern, 221 F.2d at 75.
35 E.g., Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975) (the discretionary
function exception precluded the imposition of liability for failure to impose a
stricter set of air safety regulations).
- Id. at 387.
37 Rulli v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1502, 1506 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (the FAA is
immune from liability to the extent a complaint alleges governmental negligence
growing out of the FAA's promulgation of standards).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Id. Section 1346(b) reads in pertinent part, "while acting within the scope of
his office or employment . I..." d.
40 Id. Section 1346(b) reads in relevant part, "under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id.
1990] 1123
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Thus, if the government activity is a purely public func-
tion which is not engaged in by private persons, the activ-
ity may not form the basis of a suit against the
government under the FTCA.4'
The Eastern court also considered the public function
issue at length.4 2 The court reviewed the history of air
traffic control and the evolution of the control tower. It
determined that the private sector was already providing
air traffic control services to the public at the time the
United States entered the business. 43 Because private citi-
zens could assume air traffic control duties, the govern-
ment was acting in circumstances where a private person
could potentially be liable to a claimant.44 Following East-
ern, the law is settled that individuals may bring suits
against the government predicated on the negligent con-
duct of air traffic control employees.
41 See Eastern, 221 F.2d at 73 (the Government claimed tower operators per-
formed a regulatory function and, since no private person had the power of regu-
lation, there was no analogous private liability).
42 See id. at 73-75.
43 Id. at 74. Air traffic controllers first appeared in the United States around
1929. See Seltzer, The Early Days of Airport Traffic Control, J. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL,
July-Sept. 1985, at 23. Municipalities employed the earliest controllers who di-
rected traffic by waving flags from the end of the runway. By the early 1930's,
several airports had radio equipped traffic control towers, including Cleveland,
Midway in Chicago, Newark, and Hoover Airport in Washington, D.C. With the
proliferation of instrument flight activity, which allowed flight in restricted visibil-
ity conditions, came the need for a system which would prevent mid-air collisions.
Led by American Airlines, several air carriers cooperated to establish the first air-
way traffic control center in Newark in 1935. The dispatchers passed along traffic
information to pilots to reduce the possibility of collisions. The airlines began
similar operations in Chicago and Cleveland, providing all the financing and per-
sonnel required but servicing airline traffic exclusively. The federal government
took over control of the three facilities in 1936 and extended service to general
aviation. In the next few years, the Government continued to establish control
centers. At the same time, however, municipalities were still building and operat-
ing control towers. For several years there was a dual system of federally and
municipally operated control towers, but the Government eventually assumed
control of all tower operations. Id. at 23-24.
44 See Eastern, 221 F.2d at 74 (the court noted that "an individual or corporation
would of course be liable for the negligence of privately employed tower
operators").
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III. ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiffs who contend that an air traffic controller's
conduct contributed to an airplane crash proceed against
the government by addressing the standard elements of a
negligence suit under applicable state law.4 5 State formu-
lations of the elements of actionable negligence generally
include: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately
resulting from that breach.46 The basilar issue in negli-
gence analysis is "duty," which raises a question of law for
the judge.47
A. Duty and Breach
Under negligence theory, a plaintiff may obtain redress
for a claimed wrong only if the plaintiff can establish that
the defendant had an obligation to the plaintiff, a duty,
where the breach of that duty amounts to a violation of
the plaintiff's legal rights.48 Duties can arise when estab-
lished by statute or administrative regulation, or may sim-
ply emerge from judicial decision.49 Once established, a
45 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). Where more than one state
has sufficiently substantial contacts with the activity, the forum state is free to ap-
ply either its own law, the law of the place where the negligence occurred, or the
law of the place where the injury occurred. Id. at 15.
", See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1258,
1279 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (stating the elements of a negligence action under Texas
law).
47 Id.
4a RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). The elements for a cause of
action in negligence are as follows:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional inva-
sion, and(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other,
or a class of persons within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself
from bringing an action for such invasion.
Id. Courts generally state the elements in more concise terms. See e.g., Pierce v.
United States, 679 F.2d 617, 617 (6th Cir. 1982) (elements of negligence include
a duty on the part of the defendant, a failure to perform that duty, and damages or
injuries proximately resulting).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). Section 285 states,
1990] 1125
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duty defines the standard of care against which the de-
fendant's conduct is evaluated to determine whether a
breach of duty occurred.5 °
If a duty arises by statute or administrative regulation,
the standard of conduct is often specified in the codifica-
tion. For duties which arise by judicial decree, the stan-
dard of care is generally governed by the amorphous
"reasonably prudent person" standard.5' Just as a codi-
fied standard is objective, the reasonable person criterion
is an attempt to focus analysis on an external standard of
conduct. Notwithstanding this attempt at objectivity, the
determination of reasonable conduct in an infinite variety
of factual circumstances, like those confronting air traffic
controllers, necessarily involves a significant amount of
subjective evaluation.
(1) Air Traffic Controller Duty Based on Statute and
Administrative Regulation
In aviation tort litigation against the government,
courts often rely on FAA-established procedures as the
standard of care for government employee conduct.52
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be
(a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regula-
tion which so provides, or
(b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an ad-
ministrative regulation which does not so provide, or
(c) established by judicial decision, or
(d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge or the jury, if
there is no such enactment, regulation, or decision.
Id.
.' See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 53, at 356 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. "What the defendant must do,
or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the
duty." Id.
5' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). "Unless the actor is a child,
the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that
of the reasonable man under like circumstances." Id. A "reasonable man" is one
"exercising those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment
which society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests and
the interests of others," Id. comment b.
52 See, e.g., First of Am. Bank-Cent. v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 446, 455
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating "[t]he operational responsibilities of air traffic control-
lers are governed by 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a), which requires their compliance with
COMMENTS
The primary source of procedures for federal air traffic
controllers is the Air Traffic Controller's Manual
(ATCM). 53 Because the manual is an external, objective
set of rules for controller conduct, judicial reliance on the
ATCM would presumably promote predictability consis-
tent with the aims of the reasonable person theory. Re-
grettably, the case law evidences a significant lack of
consistency.
Two related issues arise in the application of the ATCM
standard which may account for this lack of consistency.
The first issue arises in cases in which a controller is
found to have failed to comply with a provision of the
ATCM. The issue in this situation is whether the court
should find that a violation of the ATCM amounts to neg-
ligence per se or merely prima facie negligence.54 The
second issue arises in cases in which the controller is
found to have complied with the ATCM. The issue then
becomes whether proof of compliance with the manual
will necessarily defeat a claim of negligence. 55 Particu-
larly, whether compliance with the manual is due care per
the Air Traffic Control Manual ("ATCM"), FAA Order 7110.65B, to provide for
the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic"). But see, e.g., McGory v.
United States, 651 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (the court makes no
mention of the ATCM and states simply that "an air traffic controller has a duty of
ordinary care to the pilots under his supervision"). For a list of cases in which
courts evaluate air traffic controller conduct in light of the provisions of the
ATCM, see generally Annotation, Liability of United States for Negligence of Air Traffic
Controllers, 46 A.L.R. FED. 24 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
.1. Federal Aviation Admin., Air Traffic Control, Order 7110.65E (1988) [here-
inafter ATCM]. "This handbook prescribes air traffic control procedures and
phraseology for use by personnel providing air traffic control services." Id. at
foreword.
.4 See supra notes 57-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the negli-
gence per se and prima facie negligence standards.
-- Compare Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 485 (W.D. Wash. 1975)
(stating the "duties and responsibilities of air traffic personnel are circumscribed
by the Procedural Manuals in accordance with the standard of due care") with First
of Am. Bank-Cent., 639 F. Supp. at 455 (stating controllers "have a duty to give
pilots all applicable information and warnings specified in the ATCM and, in cer-
tain situations, to take steps beyond those set forth in the ATCM where necessary
to assure pilot and passenger safety").
1990] 1127
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se or prima facie due care.56 The following discussion will
address the use of the ATCM by the courts in evaluating
the standard of care for air traffic controllers.
a. Is the Failure to Comply with FAA Procedures Negligence
Per Se or Prima Facie Negligence?
Under standard negligence principles, the violation of a
statute or administrative regulation is either negligence
per se 5 7 or prima facie negligence. 58  The common law
principles of most states hold that the violation of a stat-
ute or administrative regulation is negligence per se, or
negligence as a matter of law. 59 Eastern Air Lines v. Union
Trust Co. 60 is an example of a court applying the negli-
gence per se rule to an airline's violation of a government
regulation. In Eastern, the appellate court approved a dis-
trict court jury charge stating that the violation of a Civil
Aeronautics Administration regulation was negligence as
a matter of law. 6 ' The regulation required adherence to
See infra notes 107-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of per se due
care and prima facie due care.
s7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(l) (1965). "The unexcused vi-
olation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted
by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negli-
gence in itself." Id. "Usually it is said that such a violation is negligence 'per se,'
or in itself." Id. comment a.; In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982)
(violation of FAA regulation is negligence per se).
58 See, e.g., Roland v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (regula-
tions do not create an absolute standard of care).
,9 See PROSSER, supra note 50, § 36, at 230. "Once the statute is determined to
be applicable ... and once its breach has been established, probably a majority of
the courts hold that the issue of negligence is thereupon conclusively determined
... " Id. at 229-30 (citations omitted); see also Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp.,
407 F.2d 443, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1968) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); Rudelson v.
United States, 431 F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (applying California law);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973) (applying Texas law).
Even when an administrative regulation does not expressly provide, or even
imply, that tort liability may result from a violation of the regulation, courts may
adopt the requirements of the enactment as the standard of conduct necessary to
avoid liability for negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 comment c
(1965).
- 221 F.2d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir.) (involving the collision of two planes cleared to




traffic patterns for an airport and the surrounding vicin-
ity.62 The regulation was published in the Federal Regis-
ter but the actual traffic patterns were not included. 63
Even though the regulation was not published in its en-
tirety, the airline was negligent as a matter of law because
it operated an aircraft with actual knowledge of an offi-
cially prescribed standard.6 4
Although the ATCM is neither statute nor regulation,
some courts have held the ATCM has the force of law,
based on the following logic. 65 Congress mandated the
development of the air traffic control system.66 A federal
statute, the Federal Aviation Act,67 grants authority to the
FAA Administrator to issue Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR's) .68 The FAR's require controller compliance with
62 Id. The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Board adopted and pub-
lished, in the Federal Register in 1949, a regulation for the administration of
Washington National Airport. The regulation referenced a map, which was not
included, of the airport and vicinity with lines drawn over it showing intended
flight patterns. Id. at 65.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d at 28 (FAA regulations have the force and
effect of law); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.) (govern-
ment regulations have force of law), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Ward v.
United States, 462 F. Supp. 667, 673 (ND. Tex. 1979) (Federal Aviation Regula-
tions have force and effect of law). But see Baker, 417 F. Supp. at 485 (the charac-
terization of the procedural manuals as "regulations having the force of law is...
unacceptable").
- See 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1348(a), 1348(b)(4), 1303(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
Section 1348(a) provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary of Transportation is authorized and directed to de-
velop plans for and formulate policy with respect to the use of the
navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regulation, or order the use
of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, and limita-
tions as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of air-
craft and the efficient utilization of such airspace.
Id. § 1348(a). Section 1348(b)(4) provides in part: "The Secretary of Transporta-
tion is authorized, within the limits of available appropriations made by the Con-
gress . . . (4) to provide necessary facilities and personnel for the regulation and
protection of air traffic." Id. § 1348(b)(4).
67 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1557 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
6, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1348(c) (West Supp. 1989). Section 1348(c) provides in part:
The Secretary of Transportation is further authorized and directed
to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the flight of
aircraft, for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft,
for the protection of persons and property on the ground, and for
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the ATCM to provide for safe and efficient air traffic.69
The ATCM, therefore, carries the same weight as the stat-
ute and regulations which authorize it.
Consistent with this logic, some courts have applied a
rule of negligence per se against the government when air
traffic controllers are found to have violated provisions of
the ATCM. 70 Springer v. United States is one example.7'
Springer involved the crash of a Cessna 210 aircraft shortly
after take-off into wind shear conditions. 72 The court con-
cluded as a matter of law that it was negligence for the air
traffic controllers to fail to relay reports of strong winds to
the pilots as required by the ATCM.73
Other government produced aviation safety manuals
may not rise to the same level of authority as the ATCM. 4
the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as
to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collisions
between aircraft ....
Id.
69 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1989). "An air traffic control tower operator shall per-
form his duties with the limitations on his certificate and the procedures and prac-
tices prescribed in air traffic control manuals of the FAA, to provide for the safe,
orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic." Id.
Pilots are required to know and follow the Airman's Information Manual (AIM)
prepared by the FAA and FAA Advisory Circulars. 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (1989).
70 See, e.g., Associated Aviation Underwriters v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 674,
680 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (consistent with Texas case law holding the violation of a
safety statute or administrative regulation is negligence as a matter of law, a viola-
tion of the Federal Aviation Regulations is negligence per se). In jurisdictions
which hold that the violation of an administrative regulation is negligence per se,
the defendant may still avoid liability if plaintiff fails to demonstrate defendant's
actions proximately caused plaintiffs injuries or that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. Otherwise, the finding is conclusive of negligence, regardless of miti-
gating factors. See, PROSSER, supra note 50, § 36, at 230. For a list of cases apply-
ing the negligence per se rule in aviation litigation cases, see Annotation, supra
note 52.
7 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986).
72 Id. at 914, 923. Wind shear is defined as a change in wind direction and/or
speed in a very short distance. Id. at 918 n.32.
73 Id. at 936. "The FAA and its air traffic controllers owed the aviation commu-
nity and, in particular, [the pilot], the duty to conform their conduct to their own
manuals and to provide adequate and complete information about severe
weather, including wind shear." Id.
74 See Ross v. United States, 640 F.2d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 1981) (some FAA
manuals consist of advisory criteria rather than binding FAA regulations); Colo-
rado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Colo.
1981) (guidelines issued in a memo by the FAA to its regions prior to the accident
COMMENTS
In Ross v. United States,75 the court noted a distinction be-
tween the ATCM and other FAA manuals. The case in-
volved the crash of an airplane which struck a power
line.76 The Fifth Circuit refused plaintiff's argument that
the controller was negligent for failing to provide the cor-
rect clearance height over an obstacle as required by an
FAA manual entitled "United States Standard for Termi-
nal Instrument Procedures" (TERPS).7 7  Unlike the
ATCM, the TERPS Manual could not form the basis of
the controller's standard of care because it contained ad-
visory criteria rather than binding FAA rules.78
In some states, the violation of a duty of care defined by
statute or administrative regulation creates only prima fa-
cie evidence of negligence.79 In these jurisdictions, the
defendants may offer evidence to show that their conduct
under the circumstances was reasonable in spite of violat-
ing a statute or regulation. Whether the violator was neg-
ligent then becomes a question for the fact finder.
The prima facie negligence concept has been applied to
the provisions of the ATCM in suits against the govern-
created no duty on the government since it was an internal memo and created no
justifiable reliance on the part of pilots), affd, 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); Baker, 417 F. Supp. at 485 (United States Civil Ser-
vice Classification Series for Air Traffic Control document does not establish as-
signment of duty and function to an air traffic control specialist).
7" 640 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981).
76 Id. at 517.
77 Id. Paragraph 954 in the TERPS manual sets the minimum obstacle clear-
ance height on final approach at 250 feet. Id.
The government was found liable in the alternative because the controller had
voluntarily assumed responsibility for providing a minimum descent altitude and
could therefore be held liable when that service was negligently performed. Id. at
519.
7H Id. at 518. The court noted that the forward of the TERPS manual described
the publication as prescribing "standardized methods for use in designing instru-
ment flight procedures." Id.
79 See PROSSER, supra note 50, § 36, at 230. "A large number of courts have held
that a violation is only evidence of negligence, or prima facie evidence thereof,
which may be accepted or rejected according to all of the evidence." Id. Compli-
cating the matter, some states which follow a per se approach for statutory viola-
tions have held that the breach of administrative regulations, even where those
regulations are authorized by statute, is only prima facie evidence of negligence.
Id. at 230-31.
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ment based on air traffic controller negligence.80 The
prima facie negligence approach is better suited to the un-
predictable nature of the air traffic controller's task,
which, on occasion, can make strict compliance with
ATCM provisions a virtual impossibility." The most
prominent external factor affecting air traffic controller
performance is traffic volume.82 Several courts have ac-
knowledged the intrinsic limitation on a controller's effec-
tiveness induced by a heavy traffic pattern, holding that an
80 E.g., Rodriquez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1987) (under
New Jersey law, violation of an ATCM provision is treated as mere evidence in
determining negligence); Baker, 417 F. Supp. at 485. In Baker, the court
concluded:
The function of providing air traffic control service incorporates the
elements of judgment and discretion in the handling of many
thousands of different situations, and since the elements of judg-
ment and discretion may be more relevant in any given situation
than the express provisions of a manual, it is impossible to say even
that failure to follow express provisions of the manual constitutes
negligence, let alone negligence per se . . . . The manuals may be
explicit in one instance and afford wide discretion in another. This
is not to say that the manuals ... should not be used, with the rele-
vant facts ... to determine the scope of duty.
Id. at 485.
The court's distinction may not be material. The court apparently is saying that
a violation of the manual alone is insufficient for a finding of negligence, and that
the manual and other relevant facts must be considered together in the determi-
nation of negligence. When the violation of a regulation is seen as prima facie
negligence, however, instead of negligence per se, the violation always may be
considered in light of the totality of the evidence. See PROSSER, supra note 50, at
230.
'1 Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the violation of a statute may
be "excused" under certain circumstances, such as when the defendant is con-
fronted with a sudden emergency. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A
(1965).
82 Trick, The Practical Problems of ,4pproach and Landing Procedures from the Perspective
of the Air Traffic Controller, 42J. AIR L. & COM. 47, 52 (1976). Mr. Trick was Re-
gional Vice-President of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization.
Mr. Trick recognized that:
No other factor presents more of a problem to the controller than
pure volume of traffic. Volume is a direct multiplier of all other
complexities. A situation that may be routine under normal circum-
stances, can become extremely complex with the inclusion of just
one or two additional aircraft. Why is volume such an important
factor? Because it is a drain on the controller's time-time that he
may need desperately to resolve a problem that is rapidly getting out
of hand in another part of his sector.
COMMENTS
air traffic controller's conduct is not chargeable if the pi-
lot's position of distress results from a controller's rea-
sonable attempts to provide a sufficient level of service to
more than one pilot.83
For example, in Hamilton v. United States, 4 controllers
were faced with a crisis situation when two planes simulta-
neously approached the same runway."3 The controllers,
relying on pilot provided information, calculated that
there was sufficient spacing for the planes to land in se-
quence and cleared both planes to land on runway 27R. 6
When the planes suddenly appeared on the horizon in
close proximity, the controllers hastily, but unsuccess-
fully, attempted to direct the pilots in emergency evasive
maneuvers.8 7 Although the controllers failed to issue an
ATCM required warning, they were not found negligent
because they had acted reasonably given the exigency of
the situation. 8
In Barbosa v. United States,8 9 a pilot and his passengers
died when their small aircraft plunged into the ocean dur-
ing the pilot's attempt to navigate through a thunder-
storm.90 Representatives of the deceased brought suit
against the government claiming that the air traffic con-
trollers were negligent in failing to provide weather infor-
mation allegedly required by the ATCM. 9t  The
controllers were unable to provide the weather informa-
tion to the pilot because they had turned off their radar
weather equipment, making it impossible to observe pre-
cipitation. The court determined that the controllers had
8. See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.) (an air traffic con-
troller is not supposed to give his undivided attention to any one aircraft in his
control zone if other aircraft are present), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844 (1965).
84 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974).
"5 Id. at 373.
8c, Id. 373-74.
87 Id. at 374.
88 Id. at 375-76. The court held that "when, as here, the controller must make a
split second decision, it is more important that he try to avoid the collision by
giving instructions than warn the pilots that an emergency exists." Id. at 376.
811 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1446.
91 Id. at 1445.
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acted reasonably because the weather radar was turned off
in an attempt to better identify and service the high vol-
ume of aircraft traffic in the vicinity at the time.92
The court's use of the prima facie negligence standard
does not mean that the court will excuse air traffic con-
troller mistakes in every case involving extenuating cir-
cumstances. 93  For example, a controller at Boston's
Logan International Airport was distracted from servicing
a Delta DC-9 when two other aircraft reported they were
in a holding pattern at the same altitude.94 The controller
had never encountered a similar situation in twenty years
of service.95 The trial court found that the controller's at-
tention was "appropriately focused on concentrated com-
munication efforts with ... other aircraft." 96 The court of
appeals, however, determined that the controller could
reasonably have managed the situation. The emergency
situation, planes approaching one another at the same al-
titude, was diffused with sufficient time for the controller
to return his attention to the Delta flight.97 While the
controller's anxiety was understandable, it did not justify
the government's failure to provide an appropriate level
of service to all aircraft under its control. 98
Another case similarly illustrates that courts applying
the prima facie negligence standard will not automatically
exonerate a controller merely because the controller is
92 Id. at 1447.
,, See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 381, 393 (1st Cir.
1977) (controller's negligence was not excused by an unusual emergency situa-
tion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
94 Id. at 388. The controller assigned an Allegheny flight to a holding pattern at
9,000 feet before turning his attention to a Delta flight attempting to land in heavy
fog. The controller was forced to abandon the Delta flight when the Allegheny
pilot reported he was holding at 8,000 feet, instead of the assigned 9,000 feet,
because an Eastern Air Lines plane also was in a holding pattern at 8,000 feet.
The controller quickly and successfully diverted the converging Allegheny and
Eastern planes away from the airport. Shortly thereafter, the Delta flight crashed
short of the runway. Id.
9. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 561 F.2d at 393.
- In re Aircrash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts,July 31, 1973, 412 F. Supp.




operating under difficult conditions. In Daley v. United
States,99 plaintiffs brought an action against the govern-
ment on behalf of passengers killed when a small plane
collided with a television antenna tower. 00 On appeal of
a judgment for the plaintiffs, the government attempted
to convince the court that a controller could not predict
that a pilot would fly his aircraft directly into a tower.101
The United States complained that the court was applying
a standard of care requiring an "incomprehensible degree
of human perception or clairvoyance," rather than simple
reasonableness. 10 2
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's argu-
ment, concluding that the standard of care applied was
reasonable care with consideration of surrounding cir-
cumstances. t'0 The controller failed to carry out duties
required by the ATCM including tracking the plane's lo-
cation and warning the pilot of impending obstacles.10 4
The court recognized that the obligation imposed on the
controllers was exacting under the circumstances. The
standard imposed was justified, however, because the de-
gree of care required to attain ordinary care increased in
accordance with the dangers apparent to the controller. 05
Because the controllers knew that the pilot was in an
emergency situation, engine failure under instrument
flight conditions, reasonable care on the controller's part
required a heightened level of attention to the disabled
aircraft.'O6
792 F.2d 1081 (11th Cir. 1986).
oo Id. at 1082.
,I Id. at 1085.
o Id. (quoting United States' brief).
,- Id. at 1086.
- Id. The ATCM requires air traffic controllers to issue safety advisories when
"aware the aircraft is at an altitude which ... places it in unsafe proximity to [an]
obstruction . I..." d  (quoting ATCM, supra note 53, § 133 note 3(a)).
los Daley, 792 F.2d at 1085 (under Florida law, the duty of care owed is com-
mensurate with the risk involved).
'o, Id. The court's conclusion about the effect of an emergency situation on the
standard of due care runs counter to the sudden emergency doctrine. Here, the
court expected the controller to achieve a higher degree of care in an emergency
situation. See id. The more common application of the sudden emergency doc-
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b. Is Compliance with FAA Procedures Due Care Per Se or
Prima Facie Due Care?
Another issue which arises when courts apply an
ATCM-based standard of care relates to the consequences
of a factual finding of controller compliance. As a general
rule, courts hold that statutes and administrative regula-
tions establish a minimum level of due care and, there-
fore, compliance is not conclusive on the question of
liability.10 7 Accordingly, many courts hold that reason-
able care occasionally calls for controllers to take steps in
addition to those specifically listed in the procedure
manual. 0 8
trine is to "excuse an unfortunate human choice of action that would be subject to
criticism as negligence were it not that the party was suddenly faced with a situa-
tion which gave no time to reflect upon which choice was the best." J. LEE, MOD-
ERN TORT LAW § 3.37 (1988).
107 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. 1978) (not-
ing that the court could find no cases holding compliance with a statutory or ad-
ministrative safety standard as a complete defense).
,o See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1258, 1288
(N.D. Tex. 1989) ("Air traffic controllers are required to give all information and
warnings specified in the manuals, and in certain situations they must give warn-
ings beyond the manuals."); Springer, 641 F. Supp. at 935 ("[T]he duty of an air
traffic controller to impart critical information to a pilot may sometimes exceed
the literal obligations imposed by the operations manuals.") (citing Martin v.
United States, 586 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th Cir. 1978)).
Predictably, the government often argues that compliance with provisions of
the manual is sufficient to preclude liability. In at least one case, however, the
government has conceded that the air traffic controller's duties extend beyond the
provisions of the manual. See Martin v. United States, 586 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th
Cir. 1978). "The government concedes that there may be situations where the
duty of an air traffic controller to impart critical information to those dependent
upon it goes beyond the duties imposed by the operations manuals of the F.A.A."
Id.
Martin involved the crash of a twin engine Cessna in rainy weather causing the
deaths of four people. Id. at 1208. The owner of the plane and families of the
deceased brought an FTCA action against the government claiming that air traffic
controllers negligently failed to apprise the pilot of a change in weather condi-
tions. The court determined that if the controllers had properly reported weather
conditions the pilot probably would not have attempted an approach into the air-
port. Although the government conceded that controllers' responsibilities might
exceed the express requirements of the ATCM in some cases, it felt that ATCM
provisions should control in the situation at hand. Id. at 1210. The controller's
were aware of the weather changes but, under the ATCM, were not required to
inform pilots until after observations were "taken and recorded." Since the
weather observation was not complete, the government argued, the duty to warn
COMMENTS
In spite of the general rule, some courts appear to apply
a due care per se rule to ATCM compliance. These opin-
ions imply that air traffic controllers have no obligation to
assist pilots beyond providing the services specifically re-
quired by the ATCM. t °9 For example, Biles v. United
States "10 involved the crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2 aircraft
into the side of a mountain."I' The plane crashed into the
north-south ridge line on Lookout Mountain, Georgia, at
an elevation of about 2000 feet."t 2 The pilot was flying in
heavy weather and was in contact with an air traffic con-
troller shortly before the crash, but the pilot never re-
ceived a warning of the potential danger." 3 The court
cited the applicable provision of the ATCM as follows,
"Issue a safety advisory to an aircraft if you are aware the
aircraft is of an altitude which, in your judgment, places it in
an unsafe proximity to terrain, obstruction or other air-
craft.," 14 Although the controller never issued a warning,
the court found that the controller had complied with the
manual, in part because the warning was required at the
controller's discretion. 1 5 Furthermore, the court found,
compliance with the manual exonerated the controller."t 6
had not yet arisen. The court disagreed, holding that the controller's decision to
wait a minute and half to report the change in weather while knowing the plain-
tiff's plane was in final approach was unreasonable conduct regardless of ATCM
standards. Id.
- See, e.g., Ward, 462 F. Supp. at 673 (the actions of the controller conformed
as closely as practicable to the ATCM and were therefore not negligent).
1o 848 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1988).
'1 Id. at 661-62.
21 Id. at 662.
I's Id.
1" Id. (emphasis original) (citing Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic
Control, Order 7110.65C, at 33) (the referenced section is now located at
ATCM, supra note 53, § 2-6 (Safety Alert)).
" Id. "We are not persuaded that, in light of the judgmental factor embodied
in this regulation and the facts then known to [the controller], she had a duty to
warn this aircraft of the approaching mountain hazard." Id.
, 6 Id. "Air traffic controllers cannot be presumed to have X-ray vision and ex-
trasensory perception. They must follow the rules and regulations that have been
established by experts for their use .. ." Id.
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(2) Duty Based on Voluntary Undertaking
As discussed previously, in addition to arising by ad-
ministrative regulation, the controller's duty to the pilot
may be established by judicial decision." 7 Courts articu-
late two common law theories under which air traffic con-
trollers possess a legally cognizable obligation to pilots
and passengers. First, some courts maintain that a duty
arises because the government voluntarily assumed the
responsibility of providing control services when it is not
required by statute to do so." 8 Second, courts have
pointed to the reliance by pilots and passengers on the
government's services to justify a duty of due care. 1 9
In Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,t2° the Second Circuit
considered the issue of whether a controller's duty of care
imposed responsibilities in addition to those described in
the ATCM.' 2' The Ingham court indicated that it need not
rely on a violation of an administrative safety measure to
establish liability because the controller's duty arose when
the government voluntarily undertook the responsibility
of providing services which were not required by stat-
ute. 122 Even if FAA regulations did not require control-
lers to advise pilots of weather conditions, the court
reasoned, the decision to provide weather services would
17 See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of how duties arise
under tort law.
[i See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). "It is now well established that when the government
undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation would
not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed
negligently." Id.
, See, e.g., id. (stating "[iun light of [the carrier's] reliance, it is essential that the
government properly perform those services it has undertaken to provide albeit
voluntarily and gratuitously"); Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir.
1970) (stating "[tihe government's duty to provide services with due care to air-
line pilots may rest upon ... general pilot reliance on the government for a given
service").
12o 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
121 Id. at 234. "The issue, as we see it, therefore, is not whether the government
had a duty to provide such information, but rather what was the scope of that
duty." Id.
122 Id. at 236.
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lead to pilot reliance.123 Based on this reliance, the court
could require the government to provide weather services
properly. 124
The analytical problem with Ingham is that the court's
discussion of controller responsibilities that exist outside
the directives of the ATCM was unnecessary. As a factual
matter, the air traffic controllers in the Ingham case negli-
gently failed to perform a task required by the ATCM. 125
Because the controller's failure to comply with the ATCM
established a sufficient basis for imposing liability, the
court's consideration of additional controller responsibili-
ties was superfluous. In subsequent cases, courts relied
on the Ingham court's precedent to impose liability on the
government by using a similar duty analysis.
One of the most widely cited cases for the proposition
that the ATCM does not solely define the reasonable con-
duct of a controller is Hartz v. United States. 126 Relying on
Ingham, the court explicitly rejected the contention that a
controller's responsibilities were limited to those defined
in the ATCM. 127 The Hartz court's analysis, however, suf-
fers from the same infirmity as that of the Ingham court.
In Hartz, the controller violated an FAA safety provision
requiring controllers to warn pilots of jet turbulence. 128
The court could have imposed liability simply on the basis
1 Id. "The carriers relying on the FAA to keep their pilots informed of current
weather conditions, would be likely to reduce both the quantity and quality of
their own weather reporting." Id.
14 Id.
125 Id. As the court noted,
In any event, the failure of the government to inform the crew that
the visibility had dropped from one mile to three-quarters of a mile
was a violation of [ATCM] § 265.2's command that "subsequent
changes, as necessary, shall be transmitted," and [the trial court]
properly concluded that this omission constituted negligence on the
part of the government.
Id.
26 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
127 Id. at 873. "We disapprove the view that the duty of an FAA controller is
circumscribed within the narrow limits of an operations manual and nothing
more." Id.
128 Id. The controller had a responsibility to warn the pilot of the potential
danger arising from wing tip vortices caused by a recently departed airliner. Id.
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of the rule violation. The court's resort to the common
law theory of reliance was unnecessary. The value of
Hartz and Ingham as precedent for the proposition that a
controller's duty of care extends beyond the level of care
defined in the ATCM is, therefore, somewhat suspect be-
cause in each case an independent basis of liability
existed.
In contrast to Ingham and Hartz, Ross v. United States 129
was a case in which the court's reliance upon the judicially
created duty concept was essential to a finding of liability.
The Fifth Circuit found the government liable because an
employee supplied the pilot with an incorrect minimum
descent altitude (MDA).13 0 The court determined that the
erroneous information contributed to the pilot's flying
into a power line and crashing.1 3' Significantly, no safety
regulation required the controller to provide an MDA
even if one was specifically requested by the pilot. 32 The
duty in this case arose, not by virtue of a violated safety
regulation, but because the controller voluntarily ac-
cepted the responsibility of providing an MDA.1 33
An historical argument exists in support of the Ross
duty formulation. Control tower operators existed for
several years before the federal government attempted
regulation. 3 4 Originally, control towers were operated
by municipalities. 3 5 Although a municipality built the
first control tower in 1931, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) did not certify operators until 1938 or issue a Man-
ual of Operations to establish air traffic control proce-
dures until 1941.136 Presumably, plaintiffs could have
12o 640 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981).
1So Id. at 519-20. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) is the altitude which a
pilot must maintain until he is able to see markings identifiable as the approach
end of the runway. 14 C.F.R. § 91.117 (removed 1981).
1- 640 F.2d at 517-18.
S 2 Id. at 519. The ATCM does not require a controller to give the MDA. Id
1'. Id.
'.14 See Eastern, 221 F.2d at 74. For a brief history of the air traffic control func-
tion see supra note 43.
, Eastern, 221 F.2d at 74.
134) Id.
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sued the nonfederal control tower operators in tort for
the negligent execution of their duties. Therefore, intrin-
sic tort liability exists in the function of controlling air
traffic. Once the government undertook to provide these
services, which were not required by statute, it became
subject to the same duties that would attach to any private
entity undertaking those functions. 37
Currently, federal regulations require that air traffic
controllers perform their duties in accordance with proce-
dures prescribed in the ATCM. 38 Use of the ATCM as
the standard of conduct is convenient because most cases
involve conduct at least facially violative of ATCM provi-
sions.' 39 After Ross, however, courts may impose duties
extending beyond those prescribed in the ATCM based
upon an alternative duty theory, the government's duty
arising from voluntarily undertaking to provide a service.
(3) Duty Based on Pilot Reliance
The pilot and controller share an inherently interde-
pendent relationship and, predictably, the other common
law doctrine upon which courts have premised the con-
troller's duty is that of pilot reliance. 40  Some decisions
have indicated that the reliance theory is an alternative to
,.7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). Section 323 provides:
§ 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise rea-
sonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
Id.
I13 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1989). "An air traffic control tower operator shall per-
form his duties in accordance with ... the procedures and practices prescribed in
the air traffic control manuals of the FAA, to provide for the safe, orderly, and
expeditious flow of air traffic." Id.
139 See infra notes 151-174 and accompanying text for a discussion of the causa-
tion element.
140 See Gill, 429 F.2d at 1075 (5th Cir. 1970).
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the administrative regulation based duty theory.' 4 1 In Gill
v. United States,142 for example, the court stated that the
government's duty to provide services with due care to
airplane pilots may rest either upon the requirements of
the procedure manuals or upon the general reliance by
pilots on the government for a specific service. 14 ' The re-
liance theory is analytically indistinct from the assumption
of service theory discussed previously. 144 As with the reli-
ance theory, the assumption of service theory is generally
raised in cases which involve a violation of the ATCM.145
Therefore, whether the courts intend the reliance theory
as an independent basis of liability is not clear.
In Murff v. United States, 146 a student pilot and his in-
structor were killed in a crash following a mid-air collision
with another plane. 147 Several factors contributed to the
crash and the court acknowledged that responsibility for
the accident was shared by the young pilot, his instructor,
and the air traffic controller. All were guilty of omissions
and oversights.' 48 The court said the duty of the govern-
ment to assist pilots rests both upon the regulations of the
FAA and the general reliance of pilots on the government
141 Id.
,4. 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.
1971).
144 Id. at 1075.
144 See supra notes 117-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of duty
based on voluntary undertaking.
,- E.g., Murffv. United States, 598 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Tex. 1984), rev'don other
grounds, 785 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986).
105 598 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Tex. 1984), rev'don other grounds, 785 F.2d 552 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986).
147 Id. at 291-93.
148 Id. at 292-95. The pilot wore a hood restricting his vision to the plane's
instrument panel in a procedure used to simulate limited visibility flying. The
instructor bore the responsibility of looking out for other planes. Both the pilot
and the instructor, however, were responsible for failing to file a flight plan, fail-
ing to request radar service from air traffic control, flying without lights turned
on, flying above the 5000 foot ceiling established by the flight school, maneuver-
ing near a frequent intersection of IFR traffic, and failing to notify the air traffic
controller of location and intentions. Although the controller was hampered
somewhat because the plane's transponder was "weak," resulting in a faint image
on the radar screen, the controller was negligent in failing to issue instructions to
maintain separation between the two planes. Id. at 292-94.
for a given service.' 49 The court did not indicate whether
the duty arising from the government regulation alone
could support a finding of liability. As a factual matter,
however, the court found the air traffic controllers vio-
lated FAA regulations. 50
B. Actual and Legal Causation
Regardless of whether an air traffic controller fails to
comply with FAA procedures, or is otherwise unreasona-
ble in conduct, no liability will attach unless the control-
ler's actions or omissions legally cause the plaintiff's
injury.' 5  The legal causation element requires the plain-
tiff to demonstrate both that the defendant's conduct was
the actual cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that the
nexus between conduct and injury is close enough to war-
rant legal recognition. 5 2 Actual cause, often referred to
as cause in fact, requires either that defendant's conduct
was "substantial factor" in the plaintiff's injury or a "but
for" cause of the injury, depending upon jurisdiction.15 3
The nexus requirement is generally labeled "proximate
cause" and involves either a test of foreseeability or
directness. 14
4 Id. at 293. Here, the pilots relied on the government for safety advisories
and directions to avoid collisions. Id.
-O Id. at 294. "FAA manuals further emphasize that controllers ... are specifi-
cally advised to 'continually issue instructions to pilots on what headings to follow
to maintain separation, what altitudes to fly to remain clear of traffic ....... "Id. at
293-94.
,51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 430 (1965). "In order that a negli-
gent actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not only that the ac-
tor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that the negligence of the
actor be a legal cause of the other's harm." Id.; see, e.g., Associated Aviation Under-
writers, 462 F. Supp. at 681. "It is well established... that before one can be held
liable, his negligent acts must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained." Id.
152 See PROSSER, supra note 50, § 42, at 244. "Once it is established that the
defendant's conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury,
there remains the question whether the defendant should be legally responsible
for what he has caused." Id. "As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be
limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such
significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." Id. § 41, at 236-37.
15, See id. § 41, at 265-68.
1 Id. § 42, at 273.
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Actual cause is rarely a pivotal issue although, on occa-
sion, air traffic controller negligence coincides with but
does not contribute to an accident. In Pierce v. United
States,1 -5 5 for example, a family of six died when the pilot of
their small plane suffered vertigo after flying into an iso-
lated cloud. 56 The controller failed to warn the pilot of
significant storms but the crash occurred well before the
plane reached the storms so the controller's oversight was
not the actual cause of the crash. 57
In the more typical case, when a controller is negligent
and a plane crashes, the controller's negligence plays
some role in the crash. The issue becomes one of proxi-
mate cause, that is, whether the connection was foresee-
able or direct enough to warrant the imposition of
liability. In Black v. United States,'15 three members of the
Black family died when their Cessna crashed in severe
weather between Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Fort
Worth, Texas. While in route the pilot requested wind
information from a Flight Service Station (FSS) 159 in Alex-
andria, Louisiana. 160 The FSS attendant provided the in-
formation requested but, contrary to the requirements of
part 439 of the Federal Aviation Flight Assistance Service
Handbook, did not request the pilot's route and destina-
tion or transmit relevant weather advisories. 16' In spite of
the FSS attendant's failure to comply with the relevant
safety rules, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district
court's finding of FSS operator negligence because the
storm was so large and severe that it was reasonable to
718 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 722 F.2d 289 (1983).
, Id. at 827.
Id. at 828. The plane was 50 miles short of the severe weather when it
crashed. Id.
441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
, ' The FAA Flight Service Station's (FSS) primary function is to provide
weather briefing services. See generally FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION & NA-
TIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, AVIATION WEATHER SERV-
ICES 2-3 (1977). The FSS offers pre-flight and in-flight briefings, makes scheduled
and unscheduled weather broadcasts, and furnishes weather advisories to flights
in the FSS area. Id.
1- 441 F.2d at 742.
16, Id. at 743.
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assume the pilot noticed it on his own. In the court's
opinion, this indicated the pilot would have flown through
the storm in spite of any warning. 162
Using similar reasoning, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals exonerated the government for its role in the 1973
crash of a Delta DC-9 which killed 89 people during a fog-
bound approach into Boston's Logan International Air-
port. 63 The controller in this case was at fault for failing
to provide information to the pilot concerning the correct
angle of descent into the airport and for failing to warn of
heavy fog until late in the plane's approach." 4 The court
found that the misinformation did not necessarily prevent
a successful completion of the pilot's approach. 165 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show the pilots
would have acted any differently had they received a
proper level of service from the controller.166
The Delta 191 case involved an extreme level of gov-
ernment negligence which failed to result in liability due
to a failure of proof on the proximate cause element. 67
Shortly before reaching the runway, the flight encoun-
tered a severe downward wind shear which caused the
plane to crash.' 6 The court determined that the pilots
1- Id. at 745.
163 Delta Air Lines, Inc., 561 F.2d at 381.
1- Id. at 390-93. The air traffic controller's violations of procedures included:
(1) giving the pilot a vector requiring an intercept 15 degrees above the maximum
specified in the procedures; (2) failing to provide a position report prior to reach-
ing the outer marker; (3) forcing the plane to intercept the glide marker from
above; and (4) switching the plane from radar operator to approach tower well
inside of the marker. Id.
163 Id. at 395-97. Interestingly, the court relied in part on the pilot's failure to
complain about the poor service they were receiving from the controllers. The
court found significant the pilot's use of "alrighty" to acknowledge approach
clearance and that "the cockpit voice recorder [revealed] that the crew did not
react at all to the tower transmission reporting the fog bank when it was finally
received." Id. at 395-96.
1- Id. at 397.
"17 See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D.
Tex. 1989).
-, Id. at 1265. A wind shear is a sharp change in wind direction or speed. Id.
A down draft shear can result when a rain cloud rises from near ground level to a
height above condensation level. When the water condenses, it comes rushing
down from the cloud accompanied by an intense current of air. As the down draft
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and controllers were negligent. 69  FAA controllers
breached a legal duty by failing to broadcast weather re-
ports warning of the existence of storm centers.7 0 A
NWS meteorologist, who was responsible for formulating
weather briefings and forecasts, breached his legal duty by
taking a dinner break without arranging for a replacement
during his absence.' 7 ' A NWS weather coordinator,
whose primary responsibility was the dissemination to
controllers of weather information obtained from pilots
and meteorologists, violated his legal duty by failing to
continuously monitor weather conditions. 72
In spite of these failings, the government was not liable
for the accident. The air traffic controllers' and NWS em-
ployees' failure to forecast and transmit relevant weather
information to the pilots was not the proximate cause of
the crash because the pilots obtained from other sources
substantially the same weather information which would
have been available from the government. 73 The court
held that no evidence was offered to show the crew would
have acted differently if the government had confirmed in-
formation already known to the pilots.' 74
C. Defenses: Contributory and Comparative Negligence
In some cases, the government can avoid liability is
spite of controller fault if the pilot also was at fault.
nears the ground, it takes a 90 degree turn, producing horizontal outflows of air
in different directions from the center. Id.
A down draft wind shear presents special problems for aircraft making their
final descent. The plane first encounters the horizontal outflow as a head wind
which pushes the plane above the pilot's intended angle of descent (glide slope).
If the pilot decreases altitude to recover the proper angle of descent at the same
time the aircraft meets the center of the down draft, the plane may be pushed into
the ground. Id. at 1264-66.
-9 See supra note 15 for a discussion of the negligence of involved parties.
170 In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1289.
7 Id. at 1264, 1289.
172 Id.
'7, Id. at 1290. The crew obtained weather information through personal ob-
servation, from Delta's own Meteorology Department, and from transmissions 9f
other aircraft which the Delta crew overheard. Id. at 1280-82.
174 Id. at 1290.
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Although the air traffic controller is responsible for the
safety of the aircraft, the pilot is concurrently responsi-
ble. 175 The determination of relative liability is a question
of fact. 176 Of the two parties, liability is more likely to fall
on the pilot because the pilot is ultimately accountable for
the safe conduct of the aircraft. 77 Depending on whether
the jurisdiction has adopted a contributory or compara-
tive negligence rule, a finding of negligence by the plain-
tiff may completely bar recovery, or simply reduce
defendant's liability in proportion to the fault contributed
by plaintiff. 178
To the government's favor, the controller is permitted
to assume that pilots will exercise reasonable care. 79 For
example, once a controller warns a pilot of dangerous
weather conditions, the controller may assume that the pi-
lot will take subsequent reasonable precautions.' In
Spaulding v. United States, 18  the court specifically rejected
the plaintiff's argument that an air traffic controller has a
duty both to restrain a pilot from taking off in hazardous
175 Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating the
standard of due care is concurrent, resting upon both the airplane pilot and
ground aviation personnel).
176 Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 746. "[Wlhere both controllers and pilots are operat-
ing under imposed duties, both the degree of negligence in performing those du-
ties and the extent to which the negligent performance of those duties causes the
accident are questions of fact." Id.
,77 See In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 544 F.2d 270, 276 (6th Cir.
1976) ("the pilot always remains the final authority as to [the] aircraft" (citation
omitted)); American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 191-92 (5th
Cir. 1969) ("the pilot in command of the aircraft shall be directly responsible for
its operation and shall have final authority as to operation of the aircraft" (quoting
United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960)); see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1989). "The pilot in command of an aircraft
is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that
aircraft." Id.
178 See generally Comment, The Reform ofJoint and Several Liability Theory: A Survey
of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & CoM. 627 (1988).
I'l See Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1228
(D. Colo. 1981) (controller is not "required to foresee or anticipate the unlawful,
negligent or grossly negligent acts of pilots"), affd, 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
,80 See Spaulding, 455 F.2d at 227 (a pilot cannot ignore weather information he
has been given).
- 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972).
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weather and to deter a pilot from proceeding with an air-
borne flight when the dangers to the passengers on board
are reasonably apparent.18 2 The court found that the de-
cision whether to take off into hazardous weather was the
pilot's, and further found that federal employees had no
duty to comment upon or interpret the information they
delivered. 8
3
By the same logic, the air traffic controller need not
warn a pilot if the controller reasonably believes that the
pilot is already aware of a dangerous situation,8 4 or when
the pilot is in a better position than the controller to as-
sess the risks of a situation. 8 5 In Redhead v. United
States, 186 a controller granted the pilot of a twin engine
turboprop a cruise clearance of 5,000 feet as the pilot ap-
proached a mountainous area in overcast conditions.18 7
Standards of practice maintain that a pilot may descend
below an assigned cruise clearance only after making vis-
ual contact with the ground.' The controller noticed the
," Id. at 227; see 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1989). The Professional Air Traffic Con-
troller's Association and the Air Line Pilot's Association disagree over whether air
traffic controllers should have the authority to deny take-offs and landings in ad-
verse weather conditions ("go-no go" authority). See TRICK, supra note 82, at 54.
Although the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Association has argued in favor
of having this authority, the FAA has not approved it. Id. The Air Line Pilots
Association maintains that controllers are neither trained nor qualified to make
the judgment required and that "go-no go" authority should properly remain
with the pilot. See O'Donnell, Operational Problems from the Professional Pilots Perspec-
tive, 42J. AIR L. & CoM. 39, 42 (1976).
8,' Spaulding, 455 F.2d at 227. The controllers "had no duty to quiz the pilot on
his qualifications and flight plan, or to offer a gratuitous opinion that he should
delay his flight." Id.
,8 Id. "By the time the pilot contacted Austin, the thunderstorms were appar-
ent to him. He did not have to be warned of that danger." Id.
'1- Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1203 (1983) ("The controller was in no better position to inform the pilot
about the weather than the pilot was himself.").
186 686 F.2d 178 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
187 Id. at 181.
,H8 Id. The pilot was flying under instrument flight rules (IFR). Id. The court
explained the difference between IFR and visual flight rules (VFR) as follows:
The flight of general aviation aircraft may be conducted under either
one of two different sets of flight rules-visual flight rules (VFR), or
instrument flight rules (IFR). Under VFR, a pilot directs his aircraft
according to what he can see, navigating from place to place accord-
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plane descend to 2600 feet but never issued a warning. 189
Shortly thereafter, the plane crashed into a mountain. 90
The court assessed blame to the pilot, finding the pilot's
decision to change altitude in spite of low visibility, rather
than the controller's failure to warn, as the cause of the
crash.' 9 To balance the analysis, courts may not hold pi-
lots responsible when the pilots did not know, or cannot
be held to have known, material facts necessary for the
safe operation of the aircraft.' 92 Further, the pilot's negli-
gence does not, in and of itself, absolve the government
of liability. 193
IV. ANALYSIS
Tort law is built upon a foundation of several policy
considerations. One of tort law's most important goals is
the regulation of safety.' 94 Accordingly, when govern-
ing to visual cues outside his aircraft. Under IFR, it is presumed that
pilots are unable to see either other aircraft or the ground and are
guided by air traffic controllers. A pilot flying under IFR must file an
IFR flight plan, indicating his destination, proposed route of flight
and requested altitude. Control of the aircraft is maintained by ref-
erence to various instruments on board, and navigation is accom-
plished through various electronic navigational aids, which receive
and interpret data broadcast from ground stations.
Id. at 180 n.l.
189 Id. at 181. The controller questioned the pilot's intentions when the pilot
first began to descend below his assigned cruise altitude. The pilot responded,
"We just tak'n a look [W]e're getting some ground contact here, and I think we're
gonna make it." Id. FAA regulations, however, require an air traffic controller to
issue "a low altitude alert" if, in the controller's judgment, the aircraft appears to
be in unsafe proximity to terrain or obstructions. Id.
1- Id. The pilot, co-pilot and both passengers died in the crash. Id. at 180.
I9, ld. at 183-84.
192 See American Airlines, 418 F.2d at 193 (pilot is charged only with that knowl-
edge which in the exercise of the highest degree of care the pilot should have
known).
193 Redhead, 686 F.2d at 182.
'9 Commentators disagree as to the extent to which tort law should be con-
cerned with the social engineering of safety. At one end of the spectrum is Posner
who "fully accepts the premise that the main function of liability is to regulate
safety .. " Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51 (1980). At the other end is Englard who prefers a
strict compensatory approach. "From [an] overall accident-prevention point of
view, deterrence, be it specific or general, is of only very limited significance....
Compensatory concerns should prevail, assuming the absence of a full social in-
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ment employees are negligent in providing aviation re-
lated services to the public, litigation should result not
only in fair compensation to injured parties but also in a
re-examination of the procedures that led to the injury.
The potential for liability should encourage the govern-
ment to provide the safest possible level of service. The
use of FAA safety procedures as the standard of care
against which the actions of air traffic controllers are eval-
uated has several implications regarding this goal of pro-
moting safety.
On the positive side, the use of FAA developed proce-
dures as the standard against which controller conduct is
measured is more efficient than relying upon judicial for-
mulations of the standard of care, especially in light of the
variety of complicated factual problems which are the sub-
ject of litigation.'9 5 Air traffic control is a technical and
complicated undertaking. The FAA has the specialized
resources and experience necessary to evaluate alterna-
tive safety measures. Additionally, the FAA has a singu-
larity of purpose which allows them to stay abreast of
technological developments. The judiciary lacks compa-
rable technical resources and does not have consistent
contact with aviation issues.
surance scheme." Id. at 69. Between these extremes are those who feel tort law is
properly focused when balancing the concerns of compensation and deterrence.
"Calabresi's ... critical analysis assumes four goals or functions of accident law:
two compensatory-spreading of losses and distributional equity-and two deter-
rent-specific and general deterrence." Id. at 47. The majority of commentators
would probably agree that the regulation of safety is an appropriate concern for
the tort system since "[t]he 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm has
been quite important in the field of torts." PROSSER, supra note 50, § 4.
". See Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28
TEX. L. REV. 143 (1949). "[A]dministrativejudgment is usually an acceptable and
valuable source of concrete standards defining negligence and due care and ...
the use of such standards can promote efficiency and justice in the trial of damage
suits." Id. at 166; P. HUBER, LIABILiTY 215 (1988). "Regulators, quite simply are
better equipped than any [fact finder] to make the systematic risk comparisons on
which all progressive choice is based." Id.
External factors, however, may detrimentally influence the regulatory process.
For example, well-organized special interest groups, sponsored by businesses,
may exert pressure on the regulators. Moreover, regulated entities that control
the flow of information can effectively hinder regulators by withholding critical
data. See Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1153, 1168 (1989).
The problem with using FAA procedures as the stan-
dard of care is that the agency then becomes both the
source and the object of regulation. Government agen-
cies that regulate power plants, drugs, pesticides and
worker safety standards, for example, are not in the busi-
ness of providing the products or services they regulate.
The same is true of the FAA when it establishes, for in-
stance, certification standards for aircraft manufactur-
ers.196 As to air traffic control services, however, the FAA
is both establishing the standard and being judged by it.
The FAA, therefore, is faced with conflicting incentives.
The FAA is predisposed to developing rigorous proce-
dures in an attempt to keep the flying public safe. But if
these same procedures establish the FAA's legal standard
of care, rigorous procedures increase the likelihood of
legal liability. The FAA's incentive to develop rigorous
procedures is offset by the inclination to avoid legal liabil-
ity. If possible, the courts should structure decisions in
aviation tort cases to ameliorate this tension.
Past decisions apparently have not provided the neces-
sary impetus for the FAA to sufficiently refine its proce-
dures. As the Dallas Morning News reporter observed, it
appears the FAA designs procedures to keep controller
responsibility and FAA liability to a minimum.' 97 The
current state of the ATCM illustrates the problem.
Although some sections in the ATCM are very detailed,
others are overly general. 98 Furthermore, many air traffic
controller services are provided on a discretionary basis.
"- See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1333 (Or. 1978). "The
FAA not only sets detailed performance standards for the operational aspects of
[aircraft] design, it also requires that the design be tested for compliance with
these standards by the producer and ultimately by the agency itself before a certif-
icate is issued." Id. (Linde, J., concurring).
197 Hanners, supra note 1, at 12, col. 1. See text accompanying supra note 5.
,1,8 For an example of the specificity of some provisions of the ATCM, consider
section 9-17 on Emergency Assistance, titled Information to be Forwarded to
RCC (Rescue Coordination Center), which provides:
When an aircraft is considered to be overdue or in emergency status,
alert the RCC and forward the following information as available:
a. Facility and person calling.
b. Flight plan, including color of aircraft if known.
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Section 2-2(a) of the manual appropriately establishes
that the controller's primary duty is the separation of air-
craft. 199 Other provisions of the handbook are to be given
c. Time of last transmission received, by whom, and frequency
used.
d. Last position report and how determined.
e. Action taken by reporting facility and proposed action.
f. Number of persons on board.
g. Fuel status.
h. Facility working aircraft and frequency.
i. Last known position, estimated present position, and maximum
range of flight of the aircraft based on remaining fuel and
airspeed.
j. Position of other aircraft near aircraft's route of flight when
requested.
k. Whether or not an ELT [emergency locator transmitter] signal
has been heard or reported in the vicinity of the last known
position.
I. Other pertinent information.
ATCM, supra note 53, § 9-17.
For an example of the generality of some provisions of the ATCM, consider the
section concerning general control, section 2-7, In-Flight Equipment Malfunction,
which provides:
(a) When a pilot reports an in-flight equipment malfunction, deter-
mine the nature and extent of any special handling desired.
(b) Provide the maximum assistance possible consistent with equip-
ment, workload, and any special handling requested.
(c) Relay to other controllers or facilities who will subsequently han-
dle the aircraft all pertinent details concerning the aircraft and any
special handling required or being provided.
Id. § 2-7 (§ 2-7(a) note on pilot reports to air traffic controller concerning loss of
navigation or communication capability omitted).
,- ATCM, supra note 53, § 2-1 note 2-2b. The primary duty of the air traffic
controller is separation of aircraft because the primary purpose of the air traffic
control system "is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system
.... Id
Separation of aircraft refers to the process of maintaining a buffer of airspace
between aircraft for safety reasons. The most important function of the buffer is
to prevent mid-air collisions. Several factors enter into the consideration of
proper spacing including aircraft size, speed, technical capabilities and the possi-
bility of unexpected emergency maneuvering. See generally Trick, supra note 82, at
50. Trick explains the importance of separation as follows:
The speed of the various types of aircraft presents one of the most
difficult problems that an approach controller can face. Those of
you who have sat outside an airport watching an unbroken string of
perfectly spaced airplanes make their approach should stop and con-
sider the degree of skill required to obtain that kind of precision.
The air traffic controller must not only turn the aircraft to final posi-
tion at the precise moment, but must also balance the turn on spac-
ing in relation to the speed that the various aircraft can maintain on
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priority based upon the controller's "good judgment. 20 0
Services other than separation, such as the provision of
weather information, are provided to the extent possible
and contingent upon other factors.20 ' Although the pro-
vision of these additional services is not optional, they are
required only when the work situation permits. 2
The ATCM's elective standard for providing such im-
portant services sometimes results in the implementation
of procedures that fail to afford pilots an adequate level of
service. For example, in an April, 1986 report, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) reported that procedural
problems contribute to a lack of timely dissemination of
the final approach. That beautiful chain of airplanes did not happen
by accident.
Id.
Air turbulence is an important consideration when separating aircraft. See
Apostol v. United States, 838 F.2d 595, 597 (1st Cir. 1988). All planes create a
"wake" of air currents which results from disruption of the air mass as the plane
passes through the air. The concept is very similar to the wake left in water be-
hind a boat. Air turbulence dissipates over time but the wake of a large jet can
create a particularly dangerous environment for a small aircraft following close
behind. Id.; see also ATCM, supra note 53 §§ 2-19 (wake turbulence) and 2-20
(wake turbulence and cautionary advisories).
2- ATCM, supra note 53, § 2-2(a). "Give first priority to separating aircraft and
issuing safety alerts as required in this handbook. Good judgment shall be used in
prioritizing all other provisions of this handbook based on the requirements of
the situation at hand." Id. Additionally, the foreword to the ATCM indicates
"[c]ontrollers are required to be familiar with the provisions of this handbook that
pertain to their operational responsibilities and to exercise their best judgment if
they encounter situations not covered by it." Id. at foreword (emphasis added).
2o, ATCM, supra note 53, § 2-2(b). The other factors include "volume of traffic,
frequency congestion, quality of radar, controller workload, higher priority duties,
and the pure physical inability to scan and detect those situations that fall in this
category." Id.
202 Id. § 2-2. The ATCM even carries a disclaimer of sorts, which attests to the
difficulty in defining a set of explicit procedures to address the multitude of situa-
tions which might confront a controller. Id. § 2-2(a). Section 2-2(a) states:
Because there are many variables involved, it is virtually impossible
to develop a standard list of duty priorities that would apply uni-
formly to every conceivable situation. Each set of circumstances
must be evaluated on its own merit, and when more than one action
is required, the controller shall exercise his best judgment based on
the facts and circumstances known to him. That action which is most
critical from a safety standpoint is performed first.
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weather information. °3 The GAO found that weather
warnings were often delayed, and sometimes never deliv-
ered, because of the controllers' procedure of passing
weather messages from one controller to another. °4 The
average time taken to disseminate weather advisories at
D/FW Airport was measured at twenty-three minutes.20 5
The existence of these ineffectual practices illustrates the
need to encourage the FAA to refine its procedures.
Structured correctly, court decisions could provide the
necessary encouragement.
The use of a negligence per se standard for the viola-
tion of air traffic control procedures does not provide the
proper incentive. Paradoxically, while detailed and de-
manding procedures promote safety, they also increase
the likelihood that a court will find a procedural violation.
Therefore, under a negligence per se standard, it is not in
the FAA's best interest, at least from a liability standpoint,
to develop detailed procedures. Alternatively, if the FAA
knows that courts will apply a prima facie negligence stan-
dard, the FAA would not be deterred from developing
more stringent procedures. The FAA could find security
203 Oversight on the Fed. Aviation Admin. Fiscal Year 1987 Research, Eng'g and Dev.
Budget Request: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Aviation and Materials of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 317, 338 (1986) [here-
inafter Hearings] (briefing report by the General Accounting Office).
2o Id.
The procedure of passing SIGMETs (Significant Meteorological In-
formation) and CWAs (Center Weather Advisories) from one con-
troller to another hinders prompt weather dissemination. SIGMETs
and CWAs are received at the terminal on a teletypewriter. Under
existing procedures, the teletyped strips of paper containing
weather information are given to one controller by the supervisor to
read to pilots on his radio frequency. When finished, the controller
passes the strips to the next controller position in the arrival and
departure sequence. This procedure continues until the strips are
read at all terminal controller positions. Controllers read these
warnings as time permits. If they are busy separating aircraft, the
warnings are delayed, and in some cases not given.
Id. (parenthetical information added)
205 Id. "This average consisted of the elapsed time between the first and last
reading of each weather warning. Dallas/Ft. Worth data were a result of a facility
order creating a special recording form following the Delta Air Lines accident last
August [1985]." Id.
in the knowledge that tort principles would not require
the courts to impose liability as a matter of law for every
deviation from the prescribed procedures. Instead, the
courts could account for any circumstantial complexities
in making the determination of liability.
In cases where a factual determination reveals compli-
ance with FAA procedures, overall safety is better served
when courts do not apply a standard of due care per se.
Because the due care per se rule precludes liability if the
government complies with administrative procedures, the
government can in effect shield itself from liability by im-
posing vague standards. °6 Conversely, under a prima fa-
cie due care standard, adherence to established
procedures would not guarantee a finding of no liability.
While controllers undoubtedly have the best interests of
public safety in mind regardless of the legal standard im-
posed, a prima facie due care standard would nevertheless
serve to reinforce the notion that controllers take all steps
possible to ensure safety.
The best course of action is for courts to approach the
analysis in a fact-specific way, avoiding conclusive liability
when procedures have been violated, or conclusive exon-
eration when procedures have been followed. If, under
existing state law precedent, courts feel bound to apply a
per se standard to the violation of an administrative regu-
lation, two alternative approaches are available.
First, courts could abandon the notion that FAA proce-
dure manuals rise to the level of statutes or regulations. 0 7
The manuals are simply procedures established by a regu-
latory agency; they are not regulations and the courts are
not required to treat them as having the authority of regu-
lations. Courts could continue to rely on the manuals for
guidance on reasonable conduct, without being bound to
206 "When defendants attempt to establish conformity to administrative regula-
tion as proof of due care, courts are likely to confuse administrative inaction with
administrative judgment .... " See Morris, supra note 195, at 167.
207 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
ATCM is sometimes seen as having the force and effect of law.
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reach a particular result once the evidence shows that the
procedures either were or were not violated.
Secondly, courts could abandon the administrative
standard of care altogether in favor of a common law stan-
dard of care. As indicated previously, common law theo-
ries exist to evaluate the controller's level of care. Under
either the voluntary undertaking theory"°8 or pilot reli-
ance theory,2"9 courts have a basis for establishing a com-
mon law duty of care. The court could then achieve the
same goal of promoting safety by evaluating controller
conduct in light of the fact specific reasonable man stan-
dard, rather than the administrative regulation
standard. 1 0
V. CONCLUSION
Given the magnitude and complexity of the aviation
system in the United States, accidents are probably inevi-
table. Accidents are caused by a variety of factors, includ-
ing weather and human and machine limitations. The
courts have no control over most of these factors. But
courts do have some influence over one factor which con-
tributes to the safety of the system: air traffic control pro-
cedures. The procedures followed by federal air traffic
controllers affect the quality and quantity of service which
pilots receive at most large airports. Judges indirectly in-
fluence the development and refinement of those proce-
dures when the procedures are used as the standard of
care in tort actions against the government for the negli-
gence of air traffic controllers.
208 See supra notes 117-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of air traffic
controller duty based on voluntary undertaking.
2- See supra notes 140-150 and accompanying text for a discussion of air traffic
controller duty based on pilot reliance.
2,0 See Morris, supra note 195, at 166-67. "When affirmative grounds appear for
questioning the suitability of administrative judgment as a criterion of due care,
then the negligence issue should be tried by the reasonably-prudent-man stan-
dard. Such grounds may inhere in the nature of the standard, or the circum-
stances of the particular case, or in the unsoundness of the administrator's
judgment." Id.
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The FAA has the difficult task of trying to define air
traffic control procedures to provide an optimum level of
service while knowing that the courts may use the proce-
dures as the standard of conduct for the evaluation of
controller fault. Courts can relieve this pressure by aban-
doning a per se approach to controller liability in favor of
a fact-specific approach. Structured correctly, judicial de-
cisions can exploit the special resources of the FAA by re-
lying on FAA-developed procedures for guidance in
evaluating controller conduct, without deterring the FAA
from developing the most rigorous and effective proce-
dures possible.

